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Abstract 
The practices of high-frequency trading (HFT) are dependent on automated financial 
markets, especially those produced by securities exchanges electronically interconnected with 
competing exchanges. How did this infrastructural and organizational state of affairs come to be? 
Employing the conceptual distinction between fixed-role and switch-role markets, we analyse the 
discourse surrounding the design and eventual approval of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems (Reg ATS). We find 
that the disruption of the exchange industry at the hands of automated markets was produced 
through an interweaving of both technological and political change. This processual redefinition 
of the ‘exchange’, in addition, may provide a suggestive precedent for understanding 
contemporary regulatory crises generated by other digital marketplace platforms. 
 
Keywords: financial markets; production markets; regulation; stock exchanges; technology; 
marketplace platforms. 
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Introduction: from a sociology of markets to a sociology of the exchange 
The sociological study of markets is often characterized as a project intending to 
problematize the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory, with its efficient equilibria of 
rational actors (Fourcade, 2007; Fligstein & Dauter, 2007). This has, perhaps unintentionally, led 
down a path that emphasizes the analysis of financial markets—those paradigmatic sites that (at 
least in theory) realize particular notions of competition and information. But financial markets 
do not emerge spontaneously: they instead most often develop as a trade facilitation service, 
provided by particular institutions—namely, exchanges. 
In the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century, exchanges tended to be member-
owned cooperatives. But the last two decades of the twentieth  century saw a significant 
transformation as these institutions became threatened by firms that provided automated 
platforms matching buyers and sellers. In this paper we highlight the importance of 
understanding and theorizing the transformation of exchanges for the sociology of financial 
markets. We detail the development and regulation of technologically-centralized and 
electronically-interlinked trading venues in the US securities exchange industry, and show how 
the role of the traditional stock exchange became blurred—a form of market 'disruption' leading 
to the demutualization of exchanges, the fragmentation of financial market venues, and the 
potential for pathological high-frequency trading (HFT) practices.1 
Our story is about the ontological and discursive transformation of the exchange—what it 
is; what its legal definition is; and the historical relation between the two. The case at hand will 
demonstrate that the political transformation of markets on the part of state regulators—while 
sometimes considerably removed from technological developments (in terms of direct action)—is 
inextricably informed and interwoven with technological processes. At the same time, we show 
that the necessary and critical material and legal infrastructure for cultures of HFT emerges as an 
                                                
1 We study the US case because it is an early instance of the regulated interlinking and routing of orders for securities 
exchanges, which later facilitated HFT activities. For a comparison of US regulations and those of the Market in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), see (Boskovic et al., 2010); and for the relationship of algorithmic trading 
and MiFID, see (Lenglet, 2011). 
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unintended consequence of an intertwining of technological innovation and regulatory debates 
regarding the very nature of competition and fairness in financial markets. 
 
Exchanges as fixed-role markets that produce switch-role markets 
We distinguish between fixed-role markets and switch-role markets, as described by 
Patrik Aspers (Aspers, 2007, 2011).2 This distinction categorizes markets according to the extent 
to which actors are strictly assigned the roles of either buyers or sellers ('fixed-role'), or can 
switch between acting as a buyer or seller ('switch-role') (see Figure 1.)3 Examples of fixed-role 
markets—where buyers and sellers are not interchangeable—include production markets (with 
firms competing to sell comparable products to a disjunct community of buyers) and labour 
markets; the canonical examples of a switch-role market—where buyers and sellers are 
interchangeable—are financial markets or other auctions (one can purchase a stock as a buyer, 
and then turn around to 'flip' it as a seller); see Figure 1 for a diagrammatic illustration of this 
distinction. In our case, as we will see below, we want to consider 'the exchange' as a site which 
both has aspects of fixed-role markets—i.e., multiple exchanges may compete to provide trading 
services for brokers and dealers—and switch-role markets: i.e., the familiar, furious 'trading 
floor'-style buying and selling of shares. 
 
                                                
2This distinction may be seen as in the tradition of the 'multiple market' critique of the economic conception of 
markets described by Zelizer (1988). 
3 The differing size of the diamonds in the fixed-role market represents the differing status of the sellers in typical 
production markets, in contrast with the standardization of buyers and sellers found in switch-role financial markets; 
see Aspers (2011). 
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Figure 1  a) A fixed-role market  b) A switch-role market. 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
 
Following Aspers’ distinction between fixed-role and switch-role markets, we enrich the 
notion of a traditional securities exchange. In Figure 2, we illustrate how two exchanges, a 
dominant exchange (the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE) and a regional exchange (the 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, PHLX) act as members of a fixed-role production market for 
trading services in a given stock (in this case, IBM stock). 
The trading facilitation services that these exchanges produce, in turn, take the form of 
multiple (switch-role) financial markets for individual securities. The exchange ‘industry’ is thus 
a fixed-role market which produces switch-role markets.4 Until now, the social studies of finance 
(SSF) literature has focused on largely these latter switch-role markets—as in the ethnographies 
of trading floors (Baker, 1984), trading screens (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, 2002) and investment-
bank trading desks (Beunza & Stark, 2012)—but paid little attention to the institutional 
conditions that create and maintain them.5 
                                                
4In this formulation, the products of an exchange are services - specifically, 'trading services', a term not infrequently 
used in more specialized literature to describe what exchanges produce; for example, Schwartz & Francioni (2004, 
pp. 133–135). 
5The subdomain within economics focusing on fixed-role markets is that of industrial organization (IO) 
(Schmalensee & Willig, 1989). Some of the notions from contemporary industrial organization, such as multi-sided 
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Missing from these accounts is the (fixed) role of exchanges as institutions which can 
compete to attract these trading agents. This focus on switch-role markets in SSF is in contrast to 
Harrison White’s emphatic focus on fixed-role production markets in his economic-sociological 
theory. White’s view, put succinctly, is: 'A producer’s market organizes producers into an array 
of parallel roles whose primary focus is each other' (White & Eccles, 1987); this asymmetric 
logic is quite different from the structural similarity of buyers and sellers in a financial market.6 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
markets (Rochet & Tirole, 2006) are quite suggestive and can permit a good degree of theoretical complexity 
(despite their canonical examples including somewhat imaginary entities, like now-nonexistent 'singles bars'). 
6White has outlined and elaborated on this idea in many articles, beginning with White (1981a) and White (1981b) 
and culminating with the monograph Markets from networks: Socioeconomic models of production (White, 2002). 
Intermediary presentations on similar material include White & Leifer, (1988), White (1988) and (White, 1992). 
White’s explicit influences from economics are manifestly not neoclassical theorists like Walras, but instead include 
Chamberlin on monopolistic competition (Chamberlin, 1933) and the signaling theory of Michael Spence; On 
Chamberlin, see Swedberg (2003, pp. 113–114). 
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Figure 2 In this historically-inspired example, producers of trading services for IBM stock 
include the NYSE and the regional Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX). Brokers and dealers 
are 'in the market' for the exchanges' services, which consist of switch-role markets in which they 
can alternately buy and sell IBM stock. 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
In part, this lack of recognition might be attributed to an assumption that White’s theory 
of production markets should only be applied to goods, and not services. The classical distinction 
between goods and services, which goes back to Adam Smith, is worthy of continued 
consideration in economic sociology.7 Callon, Méadel and Rabeharisoa (2002), for example, 
forcefully suggest that we should see in discussions of the rise of the service economy a 
                                                
7 For Smith’s distinction between goods and services, see (Smith, 1776). 
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'profound transformation of the rules by which markets function'.8 In our case, in one 'market' (a 
financial market for a given security) we have the furious turnover of symbolic property rights 
and a form of competition which is (theoretically) solely a function of price; in the other 'market' 
(the exchange industry) we have, among competing exchanges, the much less cleanly demarcated 
competition for the provision of trading services—a 'product' which is hardly uniform. Because 
examples of production markets in economics lean toward straightforward examples using 
standardized goods, it may be less obvious that exchanges also form a production market, albeit a 
semiotically and interactionally complex one: namely, their product is the facilitation of the 
continuous exchange of goods which—in the case of securities—are so standardized as to be 
represented by certificates in a centralized clearinghouse, or indeed nothing more than symbols in 
a computerized database (Callon & Muniesa, 2005). 
In the next two sections, we shall examine the fixed-role and switch-role aspects of 
exchanges in turn, emphasizing the sociotechnical and technopolitical aspects of each. By 
sociotechnical we aim to highlight a greater sensitivity to issues of technologies and techniques 
with respect to phenomena largely understood with technological factors in absentia (such as the 
notion of embeddedness).9 By technopolitical, we want to fuse the sense of technology as volition 
(Mitcham, 1994) with a definition of politics as intentional institutional change (Glaeser, 2010) 
to suggest that there can be no politics absent of sociotechnics, and vice versa.10 
                                                
8Callon, Méadel & Rabeharisoa (2002, p. 196). Gadrey (2000) describes theoretical progress in the goods/services 
dichotomy, including those of Peter Hill, who points out the traditional weaknesses of neoclassical economics in the 
study of services: 'Because services cannot be transferred from one economic unit to another, models of pure 
exchange economics of a Walrasian type in which existing goods are traded between economic units are quite 
inapplicable and irrelevant to services' (Hill, 1977, p. 318). 
9The term ‘sociotechnical’ is analogous to the sense of sociomateriality in Orlikowski & Scott (2008) but we intend 
to not privilege any of the senses of technology-as-tool, technology-as-technique, technology-as-social, and 
technology-as-volition, as in Mitcham (1994). 
10Gabrielle Hecht and Paul Edwards use the term ‘technopolitics’ to refer precisely to such a “hybrid form of power” 
with “cultural, institutional, and technological dimensions” (Hecht & Edwards, 2010). 
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Fixed-role markets in exchanges: the provision of trading services  
In the consideration of the exchange as part of a production market we take as our unit of 
analysis the exchange as firm, as in the tradition deriving from Coase (1937). We see producer 
firms as intrinsically involved in multiple markets—the upstream markets of which they are 
buyers, and the downstream markets of which they are sellers. Since in our case the exchange is a 
producer of trading services, the immediate downstream consumers of these trading services are 
brokerage firms, who in turn can be seen as providing those trading services further 
‘downstream’ to institutional and retail investors.11 The crucial role of the state in affecting the 
arrangements of firms in a production market goes unmentioned by White (1981b), but is 
asserted forcefully by Fligstein (1996). Indeed, for Fligstein, stable production markets are 
something that occurs not despite, but because of, explicit intervention on the part of the state.12 
In our case, however, we can consider neither production markets nor the state regulation thereof 
as occurring independently of their sociotechnical arrangements. Competition in the provision of 
trading services, as we shall see, is dependent on the technological relations between exchanges; 
and regulatory change can be enacted both in response to these technical relations, and to 
intentionally induce these technical relations. 
While there are sociologists (Muniesa, (2000), Pardo-Guerra (2011)) who have focused 
on the history of particular exchanges (the Paris Bourse and the London Stock Exchange, 
respectively) as technological institutions, we argue that there is a great degree of opportunity for 
the field of economic sociology to address topics which, for economists—and its subsequent 
market microstructure literature—are considered 'puzzles' in the context of financial exchanges. 
Economic depictions of the history of stock exchanges, for example, often provoke the phrase 
                                                
11 Some studies in finance research that see the exchange industry in this way, taking an industrial-organization 
perspective, include Macey & Kanda (1989), Domowitz & Steil (1999) and Cantillon & Yin (2011). 
12Dobbin (1994) and Fourcade (2009, pp. 36–37) argue that the regulatory tradition in the United States (going back 
to the 1891 Sherman Antitrust Act) normalised oligopolies as inherently 'competitive' within legal discourse. It 
should also be noted that Aspers criticises Fligstein for only considering the role of the state in production as 
opposed to financial markets (Aspers, 2009). 
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'liquidity attracts liquidity',13 which is to say that whichever exchange at any given time has 
attracted the most customers for a given security may remain incumbent due to a 'network 
externality'.14 This fact highlights why notions of 'embeddedness' (Granovetter, 1985) were so 
eagerly applied to finance. For example, take the 'network externality puzzle' discussed in the 
survey of Madhavan (2000), which asks why financial markets remain 'fragmented' (as in, 
multiple exchanges compete to provide markets in the same security). How, indeed, do financial 
markets become fragmented in this way? 
 
Switch-role markets in exchanges: the trading of securities 
In contrast to the fixed-role markets in which exchanges compete with each other, 
exchanges themselves produce switch-role markets: an investor interacts (directly or indirectly) 
with an exchange in order to gain access to arenas of buying and selling of securities. These 
markets use the 'continuous double auction' system of financial markets, which today dominates 
securities and derivatives exchanges worldwide: in between the 'call auctions' which open and 
close an  exchange, orders to buy and sell may be posted at any time in a continuous fashion.15 
Because each market for a given stock is switch-role, a buyer of a stock can become the seller of 
that stock immediately afterwards (and vice-versa, in the case of short-selling). (Today, this 
temporal window within which a trader—or trading agencement, as per Çalıskan & Callon 
(2010)—may buy and sell a quantity of stock that has today been reduced to a matter of 
microseconds.) Because the goods being bought and sold in a market for a given stock are 
homogenous and strictly delimited, they have historically posed as an exemplary representative 
system for the general equilibrium theory of the 19th century French economist Léon Walras, 
which modelled buyers and sellers’ continuous interests (mediated by an auctioneer in a so-called 
                                                
13 'Markets consolidate because traders attract traders. Trading is easiest and cheapest where most traders of an 
instrument or similar instruments trade. Liquidity attracts liquidity' (Harris, 2003, p. 539). 
14 'As the value to one trader of transacting on a given trading system increases when another trader chooses to 
transact there as well, such a system is said to exhibit network effects or network externalities' (Domowitz & Steil, 
1999). 
15See Friedman (1993). The term continuous auction can thus be contrasted to the call auction, in which orders are 
aggregated and then later matched at periodic, pre-arranged times. For a classification of exchange trading systems 
based on empirical observation in the mid-1980s, see Cohen et al., (1986, pp. 16–37). 
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tâtonnement process with zero transaction costs) to uncover an (presumed) underlying price.16 
And because the assumptions of the general equilibrium theory happen to be isomorphic to an 
idealized version of financial markets devoid of (in the economists’ nomenclature) ‘network 
effects’, ‘imperfect information’ and ‘trader heterogeneity’, these situations are obvious grounds 
for empirical disputation of microeconomic assumptions. 
By contrast with the example of fixed-role markets, the sociotechnical dimension of 
financial markets has been carefully examined by a number of researchers, including Knorr 
Cetina & Bruegger (2002) and Zwick & Dholakia (2006). However, only recently has the 
SSFfield directly considered the technological and computational implementation of financial 
markets, as in the discussion of the Island exchange platform in MacKenzie & Pardo-Guerra 
(2014). Electronic exchanges of any sort, at their core, automatically perform the matching of 
orders to exchange some symbolic entity. With sufficient hardware (disk space, networking and 
communications, memory) backing up such a functioning order-matching system, they can be 
relatively trivially extended to perform simultaneous matching in multiple contracts; and 
electronic derivatives exchanges, with (for example) a variety of expiration dates and strike 
prices, benefit strongly from this digitized facility for increased scope. In the late 1990s, 
observers noted the broad significance of these affordances: 
 
Automated systems can now be tailored quickly and inexpensively to accommodate 
trading in a growing number of securitized products, such as equities, bonds, 
currencies, financial derivatives, pooled mortgages, agricultural commodities, 
electricity, pollution emission permits, and hospital bed allocations. (Domowitz & 
Steil, 1999, p. 46) 
And while the role of the state has not gone unaddressed in discussions of financialization 
processes (as in, for example Krippner (2012) and Pacewicz (2013)), the specifically 
                                                
16It is sometimes stated that Walras’ original model was designed on the actual call auction process of the late-19th 
century Paris Bourse (Walras states: 'let us go into the stock exchange of a large investment centre like Paris or 
London' (Walras, 1954 [1892]). That the Paris Bourse ever functioned in a manner similar to Walrasian tâtonnement 
is disputed by Walker (2001). 
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technological aspects of the politics of financial markets are  currently a developing field (Pardo-
Guerra & MacKenzie, 2014). 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of studies on fixed-role markets and switch-role financial markets 
 
FIXED-ROLE/ PRODUCTION MARKETS SWITCH-ROLE/FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
Microeconomics 
Coase (1937), Chamberlin (1933), 
Schumpeter (1942), Schmalensee & 
Willig (1989) 
 
Walras (1954 [1892]), Demsetz 
(1968), Madhavan (2000), 
Hasbrouck (2007) 
 
Embeddedness White (1981), Granovetter (1985), 
Uzzi (1997) Baker (1984) 
Politics Fligstein (1996) Carruthers (1996) 
Sociotechnics/ 
Technopolitics - 
Knorr Cetina & Bruegger (2002), 
Beunza & Stark (2012); Pardo-
Guerra & MacKenzie (2014) 
 
 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
 
 
Setting the stage: the last days of the club 
Let us consider the NYSE in the early 1960s, then a member-owned, non-profit 
cooperative,17 As correctly noted in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Report of 
Special Studies of the Securities Markets, the term ‘securities markets’—both at that time, and 
today – 'encompasses both the markets for distribution of securities into public hands and the 
markets for continuous trading in outstanding securities' (SEC, 1963, p. 9); the former refers to 
the issuing (via an underwriting investment bank) of an initial public offering (IPO) of stock for a 
                                                
17The period of transition before the end of fixed commissions in 1975 is well-documented in Welles (1975). 
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newly public firm; and the latter refers to the financial markets of which this paper is explicitly 
concerned.18 
'The NYSE' was thus in actuality a surfeit of separate switch-role markets, one for each 
listed security, with a variety of intermediating actors (in this case, the primary intermediates 
were the 600+ brokerage firms which were then members of the NYSE).19 The custom at the 
time between the NYSE and the next largest exchange, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), 
would be for the latter to list smaller companies; once they were 'battle-tested', they could de-list 
from Amex and list on the NYSE.20 Meanwhile, because NYSE-listed stocks were not traded on 
any other major (non-regional) exchange, what we might now consider 'competition' in these 
securities markets was less present; each exchange thus had an effective monopoly in providing 
trading services for a given stock.21  
The SEC 1963 Special Study was also significant in its early discussion of the possibility 
for automation; while the discussion of the automation of order matching and trade execution was 
highly speculative, but there was more interest in integrating various reports (including the 
exchange tape) to provide 'a continuing, comprehensive market picture' (SEC, 1963b, pp.354-
355). As part of the study, the SEC also commissioned a study by the Univac computer-
manufacturing division of Sperry Rand, which concluded that 'one centrally located computer 
would have sufficient capacity, speed, and capability to accommodate the reporting of the listed 
markets as well as the over-the-counter market'.22 
                                                
18 These are referred to as 'primary' and 'secondary' markets in securities, respectively (Harris, 2003, pp. 209–210). 
19These intermediating firms are called the sell-side; one can think of them as intermediating between traders and/or 
their representatives (that is,  the buy-side) and the exchange itself. This is to say, it is the trading services that the 
buy-side is buying and the sell-side is selling, not the securities themselves. Also note that this perspective of the 
exchange’s products as a set of independent markets is a simplification; various factors (including prohibitions and 
fees) may encourage investor diversification within an exchange’s markets as opposed to across them. 
20Seligman (1985, p. 7) describes the AMEX as a 'minor league' to the 'major league' NYSE. 
21Coffee (2002, pp. 1769–1770). There were also an array of independent dealer markets for trading securities; these 
'over-the-counter' (OTC) markets were also known (in aggregate) as the 'third market'. Additionally, Rule 394 (later 
Rule 390) prevented NYSE members from effecting trades in the over-the-counter market (the dealer markets 
regulated by NASD) (Seligman, 1995, pp. 505–516).  
22“Listed” markets refers to financial markets hosted by the exchange (for example, NYSE, Amex) on which a stock 
first made its IPO. “Over-the-counter” refers to the trading of these and other stocks in settings not hosted by a 
13	  	  
The transition away from floor-based trading was also sown by the Paperwork Crisis of 
the late 1960s, when a steady rise in trading volume—led by increased trading on the part of 
institutional investors for mutual funds and pension funds—crippled the clearing and settlement 
'back offices' of NYSE member brokerages, leading to waves of mergers and departures of over a 
hundred firms from the exchange.23 A subsequent investigation by the SEC (1971) led to a 
deliberate centralization of securities and the formation of the Depository Trust Company (DTC) 
in 1973, and the centralization of clearing and settlement services in the form of the Securities 
Industry Automation Corporation (SIAC) (Keith & Grody, 1988). 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
formal exchange. (SEC, 1963, p. 657). Sperry Rand was then one of the 'seven dwarves' of computer manufacturing 
in competition with IBM. 
23Wells (2000); NYSE (1971). 
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Centralized quotations and automated execution: NASDAQ and Instinet 
By 1971, NASDAQ—the automated quotation system of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers—was operational, linking hundreds of market-makers to a pair of Univac 1108 
mainframes in Trumbull, CT.24 NASDAQ did not provide for automated trade execution, but it 
did provide a centralized, electronic repository of extant dealer quotations. Institutional Networks 
(later Instinet), by contrast, was a registered broker-dealer with institutional investor subscribers 
(for example,  pension funds and mutual funds) with dedicated lines to another Univac system in 
Watertown, MA. Unlike other electronic systems of the early 1970s, Instinet provided the facility 
for automated execution of anonymous block trades.25 
In hearings before the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance (Study of the 
Securities Industry, 1972) and a subsequent Senate report (Securities Industry Study, 1973), the 
electronically centralized quotations of NASDAQ were taken in part as an inspiration for a 
proposed 'central market system' (later 'national market system' or NMS)26: 
 
While the various formulations of the concept [of a central market system] differ in 
important respects, they have all contemplated the existence of a communication 
system through which (1) all orders and quotations in a particular security would 
have an opportunity to meet, and (2) all transactions would be reported. (Securities 
Industry Study, 1973, p. 89) 
 
In 1975, Congress passed the Securities Acts Amendments (Securities Acts Amendments, 
1975). The acts, among other changes, ended the fixed commissions of NYSE members and 
                                                
24NASD was the self-regulatory organization (SRO) for OTC broker-dealers (Smith et al., 1998). 
25A 'block trade' is simply a large transaction - at least 10,000 shares, but often much more. On the founding of 
Instinet, see (Pardo-Guerra, 2014). 
26'We.. note our satisfaction with the manner in which the NASDAQ communications system has been operating and 
intend to continue to monitor its operations and development in order to determine whether any modifications may 
be necessary as the evolution of a central market system progresses' (Study of the Securities Industry, 1972, pp. 
3447–3448). 
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directed the SEC to establish a National Market System, although details on how such a system 
was to be implemented were vague (Macey & Haddock, 1985). It called for 'fair competition 
among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and between exchange markets and 
markets other than exchange markets'.27 
The existing centralized quotation systems—albeit only used on over-the-counter (OTC) 
stocks—thus made it possible to imagine a National Market System as a centralized limit order 
book (CLOB) (Pardo-Guerra & MacKenzie, 2014). The National Market System amendment 
introduced rules to facilitate the construction of an NMS, including the 'Last Sale Rule'28, 'Quote 
Rule' (or 'Firm Quote Rule'),29 and 'Display Rule'.30 Technological developments subsequent to 
the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments include the establishment of the Consolidated Tape 
Association (CTA) (to implement the Last Sale Rule)31, the Consolidated Quote System (CQS) 
(to implement the Quote Rule32; and the Intermarket Trading System (ITS), which allowed orders 
placed on the NYSE to be executed on a regional exchange (via networked 'chat room'-style 
terminals). 
 
Electronic trading platforms in the 1990s 
An exchange had been defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the following 
way: 
 
                                                
27The amendment relating to the National Market System is section 11A (Securities Acts Amendments, 1975, pp. 
111–112). 
28The Last Sale Rule (originally rule 17a-15 in SEC Release 34-9850 in 1972) required the dissemination of trade 
execution information in exchange-listed and NASDAQ stocks on some real-time reporting system. (The 'last sale' is 
the last transaction price for a security, on any market.) 
29The Quote Rule is 240.11Ac1-1, 'Dissemination of Quotations. It required brokers/dealers to send its quotes to 
exchanges, and for those exchanges to make those quotes available. 
30(Lee 1998, pp. 124-126). The Display Rule is 240.11Ac1-2. 
31Before the Consolidated Tape, information on the last-sale price was provided by NYSE or Amex ticker tapes or 
electronic displays (Seligman, 1984, p. 86). 
32(Lee, 1998, p. 126). 
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The term 'exchange' means any organization, association, or group of persons, 
whether incorporated or unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a 
market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities 
or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly 
performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally understood, and includes 
the market place and the market facilities maintained by such exchange. [emphasis 
added] (Securities Exchange Act, 1934, sec. 3.(a)(1)) 
 
Institutions registered as exchanges are classified as self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs), which are obliged, by the 1975 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act, to enforce a 
variety of conditions, to 'prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices', to 'promote just 
and equitable principles of trade'.33 
By contrast, a broker and dealer were defined as: 
 
The term 'broker' means any person engaged in the business of effecting 
transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank. 
[emphasis added] (Securities Exchange Act, 1934, sec. 3.(a)(4))  
 
The term 'dealer' means any person engaged in the business of buying and selling 
securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include 
a bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account, 
either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a regular 
business. [emphasis added] (Securities Exchange Act, 1934, sec. 3.(a)(5)) 
 
The distinction between the 'exchange' and the 'broker' were established in a world where 
the latter was strictly subjugated to the former. That is to say, brokers needed the exchange to 
provide them with opportunities for finding counterparties to their trades. Additionally, brokers 
                                                
33Securities Acts Amendments (1975, pp. 105–106); Lee (1998, pp. 118-120). 
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were subject to the rules and regulations of the exchange. Thus, when these terms were defined, 
there was never an assumption that any individual broker or broker-dealer might be providing 'the 
functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally understood'. But by 
the late 1980s, this was precisely what Instinet had been doing for decades (see Figure. 3.) 
 
  
Figure 3 Instinet disrupts the market for financial markets by being registered as a broker, but 
functioning as an exchange. 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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In the section to follow, we shall examine—via a combination of SEC pronouncements, 
congressional hearing transcripts, and comment letters by institutional actors—how the 
dissolution in the distinction between an exchange and a broker-dealer was, in part, the outcome 
of technological changes. But automated trade execution platforms had made only a limited 
impact on the exchange landscape, until a distinct political development—the NASDAQ odd-
eighths scandal, described below—motivated the further elaboration of NMS-related regulations 
(the 1996 Order Handling Rules); these regulations in turn legitimated a variety of competing 
broker-dealer systems, known as electronic communication networks (ECNs). In response to the 
emergence of the ECNs, the SEC ultimately passed a resolution in 1998, Regulation ATS (for 
'Automated Trading Systems'), which finally permitted ECNs the choice to be regulated as either 
exchanges or as broker-dealers, and thereby redrawing the demarcation lines between broker and 
exchange. 
Our sources include four major SEC proposals and subsequent sets of comment letters: 
'Proprietary Trading Systems' (1989);34 'US Equity Market Structure Study' (1992);35 'Order 
Execution Obligations' (1995)'36 and 'Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems' 
(1998)37. A schematic diagram summarizing the period under discussion here, including each of 
these four major SEC proposals, is provided in Table 2. We coded 107 comment letters from 
institutionally-affiliated actors and individuals across the four proposals, ranging from incumbent 
or traditional exchanges, new alternative exchanges, academics, government agencies, investors 
and investment institutions, and other financial services firms; noting their support for the 
proposal in question (where stated), as well as references to particular categories of arguments 
described below (fair competition, fragmentation, investor protection, and transparency). We also 
examined the proceedings of a 1993 set of hearings before the US House Subcommittee on 
Commerce and Finance along similar lines. 
                                                
34 Release No. 34-26708; File No. S7-13-89 (SEC, 1989). 
35 Release No. 34-30920; File No. S7-18-92 (SEC, 1992). 
36 Release No. 34-36310 (proposal), Release No. 34-37619A (final); File No. S7–30–95. 
37 Release No. 34-39884 (proposal), Release No. 34-40760 (final); File No. S7–12–98. 
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During the first stage of data analysis, we surveyed the existing secondary literature on 
regulatory change in US securities law from the late 1980s to late 2000s, and compiled a 
chronological event history database (Van de Ven & Poole, 1990), observing the dialectical 
relationships between structures (regulatory pronouncements and proposals) and communicative 
events (including available comment letters and testimonials) (Fairclough, 1992) of interest. In 
the second stage of data analysis, we identified the four structures—SEC proposal releases (and 
corresponding enacted rules, when available) in 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998—most crucial to the 
technical and regulatory transition of the nature and definition of the exchange. Using an 
inductive, interpretive approach, the comment letters submitted in response to each of these 
releases were read and categorized by at least two researchers familiar with the entire dataset 
(Campbell et al., 2013).38 As shown later in Table 4, letter writers were categorized by entity type 
(incumbent exchange, new exchange, investor, etc.) The letters were also broadly categorized by 
their support or opposition to the proposal. We then analysed the content of each letter as 
compared to the others in the aggregated letter corpus and identified recurring themes and key 
vocabularies. Each letter was then coded with these themes and key vocabularies in mind. Table 
4 shows the distribution of comment letters with respect to these codes over time, and these 
categories, shifts, and representative insights assisted in developing the analysis to follow. 
 
Table 2: Timeline of events and the different actors 
 
 
New Exchanges 
For example, 
Instinet, Madoff 
Securities 
Develop 
platforms to 
match security 
trades; registered 
Strongly oppose 
narrow definitions 
/tight rules; claim 
it would stifle 
Advocate the 
ability to continue 
matching orders 
citing the benefits 
Seek to broaden 
definition of 
'exchange'; seek 
'no-action' with 
Express support 
of the proposal; 
begin discussing 
the import of 
                                                
38 Only partial online coverage was available for the SEC comment letters for these proposals; the majority of the 
comment letters were scanned from the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland (Accession No. 266-07-
0121), converted to plain text (when possible) via OCR software, and manually cleaned during reading for various 
conversion errors. 
Stasis	   Disruption:	  Online	  trading	  platforms	   1989	  Proprietary	  Trading	  Systems	   1992	  U.S.	  Equity	  Market	  Structure	   1995	  Order	  Execution	  Obligations	   1998	  Regulation	  of	  Exchanges	  &	  Alternative	  Trading	  Systems	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as broker, but 
increasingly 
function as 
exchanges 
competition of exchange 
fragmentation and  
transparency of 
pricing data 
(essential to their 
business model) 
respect to their 
activities; 
customers and 
business partners 
join the lobbying 
effort 
investor 
protection  
Incumbent 
Exchanges 
For example, NYSE 
(as member-owned, 
non-profit 
cooperative), 
AMEX 
Express concerns 
regarding 
'renegade' 
exchanges 
Strongly support; 
advocate tight 
definitions and 
uniform 
application of 
regulations  (to 
hinder 
competition) 
Discuss the perils 
of unregulated 
fragmentation and 
need for investor 
protection 
Focus on the role 
of regulation to 
ensure 'investor 
protection' 
Express 
(reluctant) support 
so long as 
'investor 
protection' is 
ensured; express 
concern over 
unfair regulatory 
burden; begin 
operating new 
exchanges  
State 
SEC (primarily), 
Congress  
 Proposes strict 
definitions and 
regulation of 
trading systems 
Expresses concern 
between the 
balance of 
investor 
protection and 
innovation; 
conducts hearings 
and  research; 
solicits opinions 
Rules buttress 
incumbent 
exchanges while 
not outlawing the 
activities of new 
exchanges; begin 
issuing no-action 
letters shortly 
thereafter 
Creates lenient, 
bifurcated 
regulatory 
definitions/ 
apparatus 
 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
 
 
The regulation of a disrupted production market 
In 1991, SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden announced the commencement of a 
'thorough and comprehensive study of the current market structure', entitled 'Market 2000' 
(Breeden, 1991). The subsequent SEC request for comments stated that the SEC believed that 
'computerized trading systems, whether operated by securities markets or by broker-dealers, are 
generally consistent with the objective of linking all securities markets through communication 
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and data processing facilities' (SEC, 1992, p. 32601). Another document, co-written by members 
of the SEC’s Division of Market Regulation, admitted the inevitability of such systems, but 
raised concern: 
 
..the rate of technological change has become so great that other, equally 
revolutionary developments seem to follow in almost stupefying rapidity. Thus, we 
find ourselves attempting to make difficult choices concerning what time and place 
limitations we will choose to retain, if any, in the absence of any lingering physical 
or technological necessity, all the while being bombarded by continuing automation 
advances that sometimes make even our most recent market structure and 
regulatory decisions seem already archaic. (Becker et al., 1992, p.328) 
 
It is important to explain why the SEC seems to be ambivalent about a transformation 
which might be considered consistent with an NMS initiative that, at that point, was over 16 
years old. We can do so by simultaneously emphasizing sociotechnical and technopolitical 
perspectives. 
A sociotechnical understanding would emphasize the presence of actors and their 
associated technologies and techniques as asymmetric prostheses. For example, the innovations 
by Instinet and other ECNs were definitively interconnected to practitioners and technologies 
from outside the financial industry. The founders of Instinet (Weeden & Co.) did so not because 
of an internally developed matching system, but because they had also funded Keydata 
Corporation in Watertown, MA, which provided time-sharing computing services (founded by 
Charles Adams, a member of MIT’s real-time Project Whirlwind) (Pardo-Guerra, 2014). 
A technopolitical perspective would recognize the (currently understudied) role of 
relevant patents on the part of Charles Adams and others.39 But it would also account for the 
relative ignorance towards technology on the part of the SEC as an organization and institution, 
                                                
39Adams’ 1969 patent is 'Instinet communication system for effectuating the sale or exchange of fungible properties 
between subscribers', US3573747 A. 
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historically primarily composed, as it is, of securities lawyers without formal training in 
engineering or computer science fields (Khademian, 1992). These 1991 and 1992 discussions 
followed in the wake of an earlier SEC proposal in 1989—on which the SEC ultimately did not 
take action—which floated the concept of regulating ‘proprietary trading systems’ like those of 
Instinet (SEC, 1989). The comment letters reveal a strong preference on the part of incumbent 
exchanges for regulation, and an equally strong preference on the part of the firms running the 
proprietary systems to remain registered as, for example, broker-dealers. While these discussions 
remain at a theoretical and legalistic level and do not actively discuss the materiality of their 
systems, their positions emphatically indicate the role of these technological systems in the 
debates to come.40 
 
Market 2000: study of US equity market structure 
Noting the technological challenge to their existing regulatory definitions, in July 1992 
the SEC released a request for comments on the ongoing study to US equity market structure 
(SEC, 1992). In order to frame the parameters of the transformation of the exchange, we will 
enumerate the most important—and, perhaps, problematic—concepts mentioned in this 
document release, including: 
• Best execution: There is an assumption that greater transparency (see below) and a 'linked 
market' will lead to better trade execution. 
• Transparency: This involves the 'real-time' dissemination of quotations and trade 
information. 
• Market fragmentation: The idea that markets are 'two-tiered'—one for institutional investors 
and one for individual investors—is raised. 
                                                
40 By contrast with the above perspectives, it is worth noting the relative weakness of the concept of performativity of 
economics in the case of the transformation of the exchange industry. In the construction of automated quotation and 
trade execution systems there is little neoclassical economitc theory to be found, despite the (incorrect) possibility of 
imagining these systems as physical manifestations of a hypothetical Walrasian-equilibrium generator (this is to say 
that, in practice, continuous order matching via a CLOB does not correspond with Walras’ depiction). In fact, 
Frederick Nymeyer, who submitted a CLOB-style patent around the same time as Smith, was inspired by Austrian 
economics, which denied the existence of a single market-clearing price (Pardo-Guerra, 2014, p. 22). Moreover, one 
finds little theory of industrial organization cited in the regulatory debates, besides the abstract invocation of notions 
of competition and fairness. 
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• Competition: The document explicitly asks, 'is ‘fragmentation’ simply another word for 
‘competition’?' (SEC, 1992, p. 32595) 
• Liquidity: It is also held that the dispersal of order flow in the situation of fragmentation may 
'impair liquidity'. 
Each of these concepts can be considered in turn. 'Best execution' is defined most 
generally as traders receiving favourable outcomes for their trades; in securities law discussions, 
brokerages are obliged to execute a customer’s order at the best available price, though there is 
no existing definitive statement of what constitutes best execution (Macey & O’Hara, 1997, p. 
190). However, when multiple trading venues are available with different bid-ask spreads, 
parameters and commissions for trade execution, it is not always clear what constitutes the most 
favourable trade. For example, one reason held for the moderate success of Instinet and POSIT in 
an era dominated by the incumbent NYSE is that institutional investors could execute large trades 
while reducing the 'price impact' or 'market impact'- i.e. the financial market’s dynamic response 
to the elements of phatic communication in the act of trading41—that such trades would have on 
the public exchanges. As Larry Harris (1996) put it, 'Best execution means different things for 
different people' (Harris, 1996, p. 1).  
Transparency is a word that often indicates a philosophical tendency towards a single, 
accessible consolidated limit order book (CLOB). As such it represents a comparable paradox to 
that of 'best execution', which is that some traders will be discouraged from the 'transparent' 
exposure of their limit orders. However, it is clear that a lack of transparency on the part of 
market-makers has led to excess spreads and high commissions in some exchanges.42 One can 
imagine the sociologically appropriate position to take with respect to transparency is one of 
ontological heterogeneity, not just of traders (as in the case of 'best execution') but of firms in 
competition with one another. With complete order book transparency, there is little one can do 
to distinguish oneself as an exchange except to compete on execution speed. But the success of 
                                                
41 On phatic communication, see Jakobson (1960). In the 2000s, the competitive proliferation of 'maker-taker' pricing 
- which grants various rebates to either 'liquidity suppliers' (those 'makers' posting marketable limit orders) or, 
alternatively, to those 'takers' submitting the orders which match them - further complicated this notion of best 
execution (Foucault, 2012). 
42 The exemplary case of this was, of course, the NASDAQ odd-eighths scandal (Christie & Schultz, 1994).  
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contemporary 'dark pools' helps show that transparency is not always a positive feature for 
traders and exchanges, and that the population of trading services firms in a 'fragmented' 
environment is likely to always include producers of both ‘lit’ and ‘dark’ financial markets. 
Market fragmentation is an especially slippery phrase, with an inherent pejorative sense 
for many, and for which our introductory distinction between fixed-role and switch-role markets 
can be applied. Fragmentation at the level of the exchange industry would seem to be a good 
thing for those who want to improve competition (as opposed to the monopolistic qualities of the 
NYSE in the 20th century, for example.) The market microstructure literature refers to the basic 
fragmentation of 'upstairs' trading (executing large blocks in a dealer market as opposed to the 
NYSE floor) as 'rational fragmentation', as it is used to reduce the price impact of large trades 
(Madhavan, 2000, p. 227). But fragmentation at the level of the switch-role financial market—
where the confluence of more buyers and traders results in the 'positive externality' of the best 
prices—it would seem that fragmentation is problematic at best. 
Competition is a concept which is unavoidable with respect to switch-role markets but, 
according to (White (1981a), somewhat different for fixed-role markets, as one rarely finds a 
state of 'pure competition' in the analysis of production markets. Some commentators are, indeed, 
thoroughly aware that competition in switch-role and fixed-role markets must be keenly 
distinguished: 
 
The competition among traders to obtain the best price and the competition among 
exchange service providers to provide exchange services often are incompatible 
with each other. Policies that would improve one competition typically harm the 
other. The pro-competitive position on any issue affecting both competitions—
which includes most issues—therefore is rarely unambiguous. (Harris, 2010, p. 
106) 
 
Finally, liquidity—referring to the presence of sufficient market interest to be able to 
transact large amounts of a given security at reasonable prices in a short time frame— is a 
fascinating category, especially in the context of HFT, where debates emerge over whether HFTs 
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are 'providing/offering liquidity' or whether they are 'taking liquidity'.43 An important aspect here 
is the facility for high-frequency algorithms to post and then quickly retract limit orders as they 
became unfavourable due to market conditions elsewhere (Dolgopolov, 2014). 
 
National Market Hearings (1993) 
Subsequent to the 1992 request for comments, in the spring and summer of 1993, the 
House Committee on Telecommunications and Finance held a series of hearings (National 
Market System, 1993) focusing on the 'Market 2000' initiative, inviting representatives from 
many exchanges and other industry institutions to give remarks and respond to Congressional 
questions; this included the Presidents and Chairmen of the NYSE, AMEX, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), various regional exchanges, and various firms 
engaged in proprietary trading systems (including Instinet, Lattice, ITG, Madoff, and the Arizona 
Stock Exchange (AZX)44). 
The published Market 2000 document (27 January 1994) provides a snapshot of the US 
securities exchange industry circa 1994. At that time, 97per cent  of the market value for listed 
companies was at the NYSE, with the AMEX and regionals at 3 per cent. Half of NYSE volume 
were block transactions. Regional exchanges accounted for 20 per cent of NYSE stock trades. 
The 'third market' (OTC trading of NYSE-listed securities) accounted for 9.3 per cent of trade 
volume; and proprietary trading systems had only 1.4 per cent of NYSE share volume and 13 per 
cent of NASDAQ share volume. 45 
While many of the actors speaking in the National Market Hearings were of high rank and 
though (testifying as they were before Congress) one cannot take their comments at face value, 
the discussions are particularly interesting, especially on contentious issues, and have helped us 
categorize the main classes of competitors in the market for trading services. Three of the issues 
                                                
43Harris (1991) is an excellent discussion of liquidity. 
44Steven Wunsch’s Arizona Stock Exchange was, at the time, the only proprietary trade execution system actually 
registered as an exchange. 
45 SEC (1994, pp. 7–9). 
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are highlighted in Table 3: fragmentation, payment for order flow and regulatory burden. The 
provided quotes intend to highlight the extent to which each category of dispute reveals the 
interests of the institutional actors in question. 
 
Table 3: Arguments regarding fragmentation, payment for order flow, and regulatory 
burden in 1993 'National Market System' Hearings (National Market System, 1993) 
 SPEAKER EXCHANGE 
TYPE 
QUOTE FROM NATIONAL MARKET HEARINGS (1993) 
FR
A
G
M
EN
TA
TI
O
N
 
James R. Jones 
(Chairman, AMEX) 
 
Incumbent 
'..because SelectNet and other proprietary trading systems do not allow for 
widespread dissemination of trading interest, they result in increased 
fragmentation and reduced market transparency'. 
Joseph Hardiman 
(President, 
NASDAQ) 
 
Over-the-counter 
(OTC) 
'..opponents of competition for order flow.. must demonstrate that 
competition for order flow has led to palpable harm and that a monopolistic 
approach would lead to palpable improvement. We believe neither is 
possible'. 
Bernie Madoff 
(Chairman, Madoff 
Securities) 
 
Broker-dealer / 
'Third market' 
'By definition, any time more than one participant marketplace is involved 
in trading a particular security that could trade elsewhere, there is 
fragmentation..'. 
PA
Y
M
EN
T 
FO
R
 O
R
D
ER
 F
LO
W
 
William H. 
Donaldson 
(Chairman, NYSE) 
 
Incumbent 
'I think cash payments should be outlawed'. 
Joseph Hardiman 
(President, 
NASDAQ) 
 
Over-the-counter 
(OTC) 
'..the [discount/regional] firms that are receiving the payment for order flow 
are, indeed, charging lower commissions to their customers'. 
Bernie Madoff 
(Chairman, Madoff 
Securities) 
 
Broker-dealer / 
'Third market' 
 
'[T]he exchanges had offered numerous noncash inducements such as 
reciprocal order routing arrangements, clearing discounts, credits, and other 
free services... We found that one of the most effective ways of overcoming 
the primary exchange monopolies was payment for order flow'. 
R
EG
U
LA
TO
R
Y
 B
U
R
D
EN
 Leopold Korins 
(Chairman, Pacific 
Stock Exchange 
(PSE)) 
 
Regional 
'..The systems that have been developed... should have to conform to the 
same type of SRO [self-regulatory organization] requirements that we as 
exchanges guard very jealously. And to establish entities that appear to be 
exchanges and operate like exchanges but don’t have any of the obligations 
of exchanges, we think is an unfair burden upon us'. 
Edward A. Kwal- 
wasser, (Executive 
 
Incumbent 
'Before any trading system initially begins operation, there should be a 
thorough review of all aspects of the system and the system should meet 
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Vice President, 
NYSE) 
 certain investor protection standards'. 
Michael O. 
Sanderson (President, 
Instinet Corp.) 
Alternative 
Trading System 
(ATS) 
'Regulation of Instinet as a broker is reasonable and appropriate. Regulation 
of Instinet’s activities other than as a broker would discourage innovation 
in the securities industry'. 
Source: Compiled by authors; quotes from National Market System (1993). 
 
 
The Order Handling Rules (1996): the Limit Order Display Rule and amended 
Quote Rule 
Characteristic of the distinction between dealer-based markets (like NASDAQ) and those based 
on order matching (for example, the NYSE) was the absence, in dealer markets, of public limit 
orders (Cohen et al., 1986, p. 19), even if there existed limit orders better than the current market-
maker’s quote for a security. A well-publicized study in 1994 (Christie & Schultz, 1994) revealed 
the possibility of collusion on the part of NASDAQ dealers to keep quote spreads artificially 
wide (revealed in their data because the dealers’ convention was to stick to even-eighths quotes 
and avoid odd-eighths quotes). A subsequent release proposed that quotes be published openly 
whenever an exchange or market-maker trades more than 1 per cent of a security’s aggregate 
volume (SEC, 1995). 
 
Up until the adoption of these 'Order Handling Rules' in September 1996, a NASDAQ 
broker-dealer would have no obligation to alter their quote in the system to reflect an incoming 
customer limit order.46 The SEC had found the existence of a 'two-tiered market' where market-
makers would 'routinely trade at one price with retail customers and at better prices with ECN 
subscribers', and insisted that 'all investors' should be able to fill orders at the best offered price 
(SEC, 1996, p. 48308). The Limit Order Display Rule required that customer limit orders better 
than a market-maker’s quotes must be reflected in those quotes (or forwarded to another [entity] 
that will display the order) (Smith et al., 1998). The amendment to the Quote Rule includes the 
                                                
46The proposed rules are SEC (1995); The final rules are in SEC (1996). The Limit Order Display Rule is Rule 
11Ac1-4; the amended Quote Rule ('ECN Alternative' to 'Dissemination of Quotations') is Rule 11Ac1-1. 
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'ECN Amendment' which requires market-makers to publicly post any limit orders sent to ECNs 
which are better than the extant public quote (Odders-White, 2004, pp. 280–281). 
Interestingly, very few of the public comment letters supported this proposal without 
reservation, and even the ECNs (or the firms investing in future ECNs) had reservations about the 
new rules. One future ECN investor, Bear Stearns, instead proposed their own limit order book 
technology (which would make that technology the valuable centre of calculation instead of the 
quote-broadcasting complexities of the SEC proposal). Other ECNs, like Instinet, appear to have 
met only in private, with only brief summary memorandums available in the SEC’s archives. 
Unsurprisingly, broker/dealers, looking forward to better prices for their customers, widely 
supported the proposal (see Table 5.) 
The order handling rules, once finalized, 'brought the order-driven market into the quoted 
market' (Schwartz et al., 2013, p. 20). It allowed ECNs to post orders in the NASDAQ quote 
montage, and potentially, fill it themselves (at a lower cost).47 With this situation in place, ECNs 
were effectively no less powerful than NASDAQ dealers, and potentially more inexpensive for 
traders. (See Figure. 4.) The industry had changed overnight, and when anyone can run their own 
exchange with electronic access to the same buyers and sellers, one might ask: just what did it 
mean to be an exchange versus an ECN?48 
 
                                                
47Angel et al.,  (2011, pp. 33–34). (The NYSE had a higher latency of placing and canceling orders.) 
48For more on the effect of the Order Handling Rules, see Schwartz & Francioni (2004, pp. 229–230). According to 
Schwartz & Francioni (2004, p. 241), 'A market maker could use a Nasdaq system (SelectNet) to send an order it has 
received to another market maker or to broadcast the order to all market makers. As quote providers, an ECN could 
also connect directly into SelectNet. SelectNet included a negotiation feature that allows a participant (market maker 
or ECN) to accept, reject, or counter a received order'. 
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Figure 4  ECN disruption via direct access to NASDAQ quote montage. 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
  
Table 4 (a, b, c, d): Analysis of SEC comment letters for relevant releases in 1989, 1992, 
1995 and 1998  
1989: Proprietary Trading Systems (SEC S7-13-89) 
Entity Type Support Fair Competition Fragmentation Investor 
Protection 
Transparency 
Incumbent 4/4 3/4 1/4 0/4 0/4 
New Exchange 0/4 2/4 0/4 1/4 0/4 
Investor - - - - - 
Academic - - - - - 
Financial Institution 1/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 
Industry 
Association 
- - - - - 
Broker/Dealer - - - - - 
Government - - - - - 
Service Provider 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 
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1992: US Equity Market Structure Study (SEC S7-18-92) 
Entity Type Stated opposition 
to no-action 
Fair Competition Fragmentation Investor 
Protection 
Transparency 
Incumbent 1/10 5/10 8/10 6/10 6/10 
New Exchange 0/6 2/6 5/6 1/6 4/6 
Investor 0/8 1/8 5/8 3/8 5/8 
Academic 0/7 0/7 1/7 1/7 0/7 
Financial Institution 0/2 0/2 2/2 0/2 0/2 
Industry 
Association 
0/2 1/2 0/2 1/2 1/2 
Broker/Dealer 0/2 0/2 2/2 0/2 2/2 
Government 0/2 0/2 2/2 0/2 2/2 
Service Provider 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 
 
1995: Order Execution Obligations  (SEC S7-30-95) 
Entity Type Support Fair Competition Fragmentation Investor 
Protection 
Transparency 
Incumbent 3*/4 1/4 0/4 3/4 2/4 
New Exchange 0**/3 0/3 1/3 0/3 1/3 
Investor 4/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 5/7 
Academic 0/2 0/2 1/2 0/2 1/2 
Financial Institution 2/7 0/7 2/7 0/7 6/7 
Industry 
Association 
- - - - - 
Broker/Dealer 6/8 0/8 1/8 0/8 4/8 
Government 1*** 0/1 1/1 0/1 1/1 
Service Provider - - - - - 
* with various caveats and reservations 
**Some existing ECNs absent; Instinet meeting in private only 
*** supports parts 
  
1998: Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems (SEC S7-12-98) 
Entity Type Support Fair Competition Fragmentation Investor 
Protection 
Transparency 
Incumbent 7*/8 3/8 2/8 4/8 4/8 
New Exchange 5/5 1/5 2/5 4/5 3/5 
Investor 2/7 0/7 1/7 0/7 4/7 
Academic - - - - - 
Financial Institution 0/1 0/1 0/1 1/1 1/1 
Industry 1/2 0/2 0/2 1/2 1/2 
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Association 
Broker/Dealer - - - - - 
Government - - - - - 
Service Provider 1/2 1/2 0/2 0/2 - 
* with caveats: if implemented a certain way, wanted assurance of equal treatment of exchanges and non-exchanges  
 
Source: SEC Comment Letters from National Archives II in College Park, Maryland (Accession 
No. 266-07-0121).  
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Regulation ATS (1998) and the semantics of the exchange 
In 1997 the SEC issued a Concept Release for what came to be known as Regulation ATS 
('Regulation of Exchanges' (SEC, 1997)); after a comment period, the final rules were released in 
1998 (SEC, 1998). It provided a new definition of ‘exchange’: 
 
The statutory definition of 'exchange' includes a 'market place or facilities for 
bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing 
with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange'. 
The new rule interprets these terms to include any organization, association, or 
group of persons that: (1) Brings together the orders of multiple buyers and sellers; 
and (2) uses established, non-discretionary methods (whether by providing a 
trading facility or by setting rules) under which such orders interact with each 
other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders agree to the terms of a trade. 
(SEC, 1998, p. 70848) 
 
The primary discursive difference here is from a focus on bringing together purchasers 
over bringing together orders. This is not precisely a transformation in the ontology of the 
exchange, because floor-based trading is also characterized by a flow of such orders. However, it 
is a transformation in the (legal) semantics of the exchange: a move from seeing an exchange as a 
place where buyers and sellers of securities (or, more specifically, their agent intermediaries) are 
brought together to a place where orders (which may have a variety of origins) are brought 
together.49 
Ultimately, as Karmel (2002, p. 89) describes, although the SEC did manage to redefine 
the 'exchange' from its previous interpretations, the goal of Regulation ATS appears to be 'to 
force ATSs with substantial volume in [National Market System] quotation and transaction 
reporting rules, [and] not to change the way in which exchanges operate or are governed'. The 
                                                
49 The phrasing 'non-discretionary methods', it is explained, is meant to distinguish matching algorithms from the 
activity at traditional block trading desks which would 'shop around' and break up a customer order (SEC, 1998, 
70851). For general remarks on Reg ATS, see Domowitz & Lee (2001).  
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transformation of the exchange was thus a legal construction which legally sanctioned a 
technological shift which had already occurred. 
 
Table 5: Outcomes for ECNs in the 2000s  
ECN FOUNDED ORIGINAL OWNERSHIP OUTCOME 
 
Instinet 
 
1967 
 
Institutional Networks 
Sold to Reuters (1985), 
Merged with Island 
ECN (2002), Acquired 
by NASDAQ (2005) 
Redibook  
1992 
 
Spear, Leeds & Kellog, 
others 
 
Merged into 
Archipelago, 2002 
Tradebook  
1996 
 
Bloomberg 
 
Still operating 
Island  
1997 
 
Datek Online Holdings 
(majority) 
 
Acquired by Instinet in 
2002 
Archipelago  
1997 
 
Terra Nova Trading 
Sold to investors in 
2000; Sold to Instinet in 
2002, rewrote Instinet’s 
matching engine 
BRUT (Brass Utility)  
1998 
 
Multiple firms, later 
Sungard Data Systems 
 
Sold to  NASDAQ 
(2004) 
Strike  
1998 
 
Bear Stearns 
Merged with BRUT 
(1999)  
Source: Some data from (Liebenberg, 2002, p. 77).  
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Conclusion: the customer as competitor, and the valuation of marketplace 
platforms 
 
Over time, exchanges have been behaving more like intermediaries, and 
intermediaries have been behaving more like traditional exchanges. (Cybo-Ottone, 
Noia, & Murgia, 2000, p. 224) 
'All natural economic distinctions between stock exchanges and broker dealers have 
broken down... Exchanges and brokers are now doing exactly the same thing'—  
Benn Steil. (Alpert, 1999, p. 22)  
	  
The above quotes indicate the situation at the end of the century: in an exchange industry 
which now obliged the exposure of orders and quotes, the very foundations of the former 
production market—in which exchanges would sell the facility to trade downstream to traders via 
intermediating brokers—had collapsed. The subsequent decade in the exchange industry was 
dramatic, including the rapid demutualization of major exchanges and waves of mergers (see 
Table 5 for an enumeration of the acquisitions and mergers of the ECNs of the late 1990s) 
(Domowitz, 1995). In 2002, another analysis by Benn Steil concluded: 
 
The inexorable trend toward securities exchanges operated as for-profit public 
companies with nonmember ownership is a direct product of the automation of 
trading systems. (Steil, 2002, p. 80) 
 
Such a statement, prima facie, represents perhaps the quintessence of technopolitics. In 
this case a major industrial transformation has as its primary causal factor the implementation 
(and clones thereof) of an electronic version of a trading floor specialist’s limit order book. While 
our work here does not examine the twenty first-century exchange landscape, it is difficult to 
ignore the essential conceptual tension here between a unified, single (monopoly) network and 
the chaos that ensues when (as with the 'National Market System' concept) a regulatory agency 
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attempts to unify (fixed-role) providers of (switch-role) financial markets which, effectively, 
become fast-paced clones of each other. 
The exchange industry scholar Ruben Lee in 2002 predicted, given the many sources of 
income of an exchange (i.e., the multiple production markets for which the firm takes the role of 
a seller)—including 'fees for listing, trading, clearing, and settlement, and charges for the 
provision of company news and for quote and trade data' —that the exchange industry had found 
itself in a similar position to the media industry (via digital distribution of content and 
increasingly online advertising marketplaces): 
 
In the language of the media industry, which they will effectively have joined, 
exchanges will be content providers. As such, they are likely to mimic the activities 
of other similar media companies. (Lee, 2002, p. 2) 
 
Lee points out that as the marginal cost of executing a transaction gets close to zero, 
competition between exchanges will lead to increased payment for order flow, or 'paying for the 
privilege of executing orders on their trading systems'. This had indeed already begun, with 
Island’s introduction of so-called 'maker-taker' payments/fees, which gave a rebate to those 
'makers' submitting standing limit orders, and added a fee to 'takers' executing market orders or 
marketable limit orders. Lee argued, correctly, that this would become the norm (Lee, 2002, pp. 
1-2). His use of a media industry analogy is appropriate here, as so-called 'two-sided platforms' 
like newspaper firms subsidize readers (by providing free or inexpensive news) at the expense of 
advertisers (Evans, 2003). Another important remaining source of income, he suggests, would be 
quotation and sale data; and indeed, the income from these data feeds (as partially revealed in the 
newly demutualized firms’ annual reports) became a prominent source of income for exchanges 
in today’s fragmented, high-frequency markets. 
Following the analysis and findings in this paper, we suggest that a first step can be made 
towards a new way of thinking about the sociological study of markets. Specifically, by explicitly 
distinguishing the specialized, distinctive properties of switch-role financial markets from those 
of  fixed-role markets, we identify a potentially new field of economic processes worthy of 
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investigation; one which is as intriguingly and processually intermingled with economic theory as 
before, but corresponding with the differing jargon of multi-sided markets and two-sided 
platforms from twenty first-century industrial organization.  
More generally, our study points to an impending theoretical and policy-oriented 
dilemma. On the one hand, various industries are already confronting the rise of marketplace-
platform startups like Uber and Airbnb—which, like electronic exchanges, bring together buyers 
and sellers without any of the logistical concerns of materially-mediated supply-chain 
management. On the other hand, there exists the equally problematic alternative of intensive legal 
enforcement—in the name of competition and of securing some unified 'national market 
system'—which would oblige competing firms to expose their customers’ bids and offers, thus 
potentially leading to a fragmented production market of various services where firms ruthlessly 
compete for flows of orders without ever being able to maintain even temporary network 
dominance. Furthermore, what, in such a technopolitical environment, such as the one which 
developed in financial exchanges and is only now being realized elsewhere, may stop any 
customer from implementing their own matching engine, and thus becoming themselves a 
competitor? This, we suggest, can be an agenda-setting question for economic sociology in the 
near future. 
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